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This discussion paper presents the results of a consultancy undertaken for
the Northern Land Council (NLC) on the economic impacts of the payment
of mining moneys with respect to the Nabarlek uranium mine in western
Amhem Land. The particular focus of the research is on the operations of
the Nabarlek Traditional Owners Association (NTOA) since 1988, but this
contemporary emphasis is contextualised with reference to complex
historical, legislative and sociopolitical legacies that have greatly
influenced the Association's performance. In terms of regional economic
development, empowerment and the establishment of a long-term
economic base, the NTOA has been unsuccessful. For these reasons, it is
instructive to consider what lessons can be learnt for the future from this
case study especially as it is the first major resource development project in
the post-land rights era to close. The passage of the Native Title Act 1993,
and the potential for the payment of agreement moneys to native title
holders with respect to commercial development of their land, enhances the
significance of the research findings and recommendations in this paper.
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Foreword
In May 1993, the Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research
(CAEPR), Faculty of Arts, Australian National University and the Northern
Land Council (NLC) signed an agreement for preliminary research to be
undertaken on the economic impact of mining in Western Arnhem Land.
This research was undertaken between June and September 1993 by Ms
Diane Smith and myself as consultants. An important feature of the
contract was provision at paragraph 4.4 (i) that research outcomes be
published in the CAEPR Discussion Paper series. This requirement is
stipulated in any consultancy work undertaken by CAEPR.
A draft report was completed in September 1993 and submitted to the NLC
seeking comment. At the same time, the report was submitted to several
readers for confidential academic peer review. This discussion paper is the
published version of the final consultancy report provided to the NLC in
May 1994. The only difference in this version is that the executive
summary and recommendations that prefaced the report provided to the
NLC are included here as an attachment at the end of the paper.
It is important to emphasise that the findings presented here are those of
independent consultants; our views are not necessarily shared by all NLC
staff or the members of the Nabarlek Traditional Owners Association. As
we emphasise in the report, many problems that we highlight have their
genesis in legislative, administrative and historical ambiguities. There is no
suggestion that the NLC, as currently constituted, would allow such
problems to occur today. Nevertheless, we do believe, as did the NLC
when commissioning this research, that there are very important lessons to
be learnt from the Nabarlek case, both for other Aboriginal associations
that might receive mining moneys, and especially, in the contemporary




In 1993, the Northern Land Council (NLC) commissioned the Centre for
Aboriginal Economic Policy Research (CAEPR) to conduct a preliminary
assessment of the economic impact of mining moneys paid to the Nabarlek
Traditional Owners Association (NTOA). It was a strategic move on the
Land Council's part, given the intense interest surrounding resource
development and compensation issues in the post-Mabo policy
environment, but one not without risks, hi the Northern Territory, the
payment of mining moneys to Aboriginal people residing near major
resource developments located on Aboriginal land has been one of the
fundamental mechanisms created by the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 to improve the economic status of both traditional
owners and other residents of areas affected by resource development
projects. However, the mechanisms created under the Act to transfer
mining moneys to Aboriginal interests are complex. In addition, there have
been significant changes in the procedures by which such payments are
made; in the interpretation and operation of the legislative framework; and
in views of the land councils' role in these matters. There has also been
considerable confusion regarding the nature and purposes of mining
moneys: Are such moneys private Aboriginal or public moneys? Are they
compensation payments or mineral rent? Not surprisingly, there have been
noticeable variations in the performance of what are frequently, and
perhaps inappropriately, termed 'royalty associations'.1
The NLC is aware that significant financial resources have been wasted in
West Arnhem Land and that its own role in negotiating and monitoring the
payment of mining moneys, though ambiguously stipulated under the Land
Rights Act, nevertheless subjects it to intense public scrutiny. Such
scrutiny often unfairly exceeds that to which many other State and
Commonwealth bodies also involved in such matters are subjected. The
NLC has fully supported the publication of this research. It is
commendable that in the interests of learning from the mistakes of the past
such research is being sponsored and that it is providing input to further
review of the NTOA currently under way.
The focus here is on the Aboriginal beneficiaries from mining moneys paid
in relation to the Queensland Mines Limited (QML) uranium mine at
Nabarlek in Western Arnhem Land. Attention has been directed to the
impact of only two types of mining moneys paid to Aboriginal people:
payments made in accordance with mining agreements under s.43 of the
Land Rights Act, and payments made in accord with s.64(3), sometimes
referred to as 'areas affected moneys'. The latter moneys are a stipulated
share (30 per cent) of royalty equivalents paid to Aboriginal people
residing in the area affected by mining operations. The specific research
focus is on the NTOA. But whereas payments from the mine have been
made since the signing of the QML Agreement in March 1979, the NTOA
has only been in existence since 1988. Prior to that, payments were made to
a number of incorporated Aboriginal associations in the region and even to
unincorporated groups of traditional owners. From 1982-88, payments
were made to the Kunwinjku Association that was wound up in 1988.
The Nabarlek case is of significance on a number of counts. First, the
uranium mine is the first post-land rights mine in the Northern Territory to
close; while the QML Agreement expires in 1995, milling at Nabarlek
stopped in 1988. While some agreement payments are still made to the
NTOA, mining moneys paid to the region have declined rapidly since
1988. Even though other royalty associations have experienced income
fluctuations, this is the first case where mining moneys have declined to
negligible amounts. Second, it has already been established in the literature
(see Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies (AIAS) 1984; Altman 1983;
Kesteven 1983; and O'Faircheallaigh 1988b, 1993a) that the financial
performance of the Kunwinjku Association has been one of the worst in the
post-land rights era. All told, in the period 1979-93 approximately $14
million was paid to Aboriginal people in the West Arnhem region with
respect to the QML mine and it now appears clear that few resources have
been utilised for long-term investments that would allow the creation of an
economic base for future generations. The Kunwinjku Association had
widely publicised financial difficulties in the early to mid 1980s. Many
reasons for its failure have been assessed by O'Faircheallaigh (1988a,
1988b, 1993a, 1993b). The financial performance of the NTOA is
inextricably linked to that of its predecessor, the Kunwinjku Association,
and any assessment must take into account the legacy of that earlier
Association.
The performance of the NTOA has not been reviewed to date. This paper
not only presents such a review, but also assesses the role of numerous
agencies, including the NLC, key Commonwealth and Northern Territory
departments, and QML, and their ability to strategically respond to the
difficulties encountered by the NTOA subsequent to its establishment in
1988.
Inevitably, many contending viewpoints and areas of confusion mentioned
above have been raised by our research. For this reason, the legislative
complexities have been outlined in some detail below and the particular
circumstances of the NTOA's establishment, so central to its subsequent
poor financial performance, have been examined. In conclusion, we
highlight how obvious problems, the products of a complex legislative and
historical legacy, might be avoided in future in establishing other royalty
associations.
Research methodology
The consultants undertook this research task with a considerable research
background, working both in the West Arnhem region and on mining-
related issues. For example, Altman examined the operations of the QML
Agreement and the establishment and early operations of the Kunwinjku
Association (Altman 1983). Subsequently, in 1984, both Altaian and Smith
worked on the review of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust Account (ABTA),
the institution now operating under the bureaucratic umbrella of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) that receives
and disburses mining equivalent payments from mining on Aboriginal land
(Altman 1985). In 1990, Altman and Smith worked in the region as part of
a consultancy for the Resource Assessment Commission's Kakadu
Conservation Zone Inquiry (Altman and Smith 1990). Altman has
examined other economic issues in the region: working at outstations in
West Arnhem Land (1979-81); for the Gagudju Association (1983); on
tourism in Kakadu (1986); and on the regional arts and crafts industry
(1989). Smith undertook research on traditional ownership of land in West
Arnhem Land in 1982 (Kesteven and Smith 1984).
Fieldwork for this particular preliminary phase was very brief, being
limited to a five day visit to Darwin and five days in Jabiru, Oenpelli and
Nabarlek in late June 1993. Very useful discussions were held with the
NTOA manager in the NLC Jabiru office. The consultants met with the
NTOA Committee and a number of Association members for discussions
at Gunbalanya. At these meetings we emphasised that our report would be
frank. Discussions were also held with officers of the Gunbalanya Council,
Injalak Arts and Crafts and the Demed Outstation Resource Association in
Gunbalanya. After two meetings at Gunbalanya, the NTOA approved the
continuation of the preliminary research with the stipulation that our
preliminary findings would be presented to the anticipated Annual General
Meeting of the NTOA in late September 1993.2
Discussions were held in Darwin with a number of NLC staff,
representatives of QML, staff of the ABTA, ATSIC, the Northern Territory
Office of Aboriginal Development and the Australian Nature Conservation
Agency. This research has benefited from access to two draft chapters titled
'Aboriginal mining payments' and 'Mining payments: evaluating and
explaining policy outcomes' by Ciaran O'Faircheallaigh that will form part
of a monograph he is writing tentatively titled Evaluating Government
Policies: Uranium Policy and Aboriginal People in Australia's Northern
Territory, 1977-92.
Outline and caveats
Many of the economic and policy problems associated with the utilisation
of mining moneys in West Arnhem Land have their roots in legislative
ambiguities and institutional dilemmas, a number of which have already
been raised in the literature. But problems have been exacerbated by
inappropriate structures, ineffective support from key agencies, and by
regional Aboriginal politicking. We divide the period since the signing of
the QML Agreement in March 1979 into three distinct time frames:
• Phase 1: 1979-82, the period when agreement payments were made
with respect to the mine, but prior to the payment of areas affected
moneys;
• Phase 2: 1982-88, which corresponds with the life of the Kunwinjku
Association, established to receive both agreement and areas affected
moneys; and
• Phase 3: the period since 1988 which marks both the demise of the
Kunwinjku Association and its replacement by the NTOA, and the
completion of milling at Nabarlek.
While an assessment of each phase is presented, the greatest emphasis is
placed on the period since the establishment of the NTOA in 1988 to the
time of our research (June to September 1993).
A concluding section outlines the policy issues and implications that
emanate from this historical analysis and review. The focus is primarily on
regional issues pertinent to the likely future of the NTOA and the role of
the NLC, and to a lesser extent on the wider issues in relation to the
utilisation of compensatory mining moneys, particularly in the context of
discussions about native title legislation and compensation payments that
may be made under the new Native Title Act 1993.
This discussion here focuses very specifically on the utilisation of mining
moneys in the West Arnhem region. This emphasis is driven, in large part,
by the need to assess the commonly-held expectation that Aboriginal
empowerment in the regional economy would result from the strategic
utilisation of mining moneys. The research conducted is not a social impact
study; such a study would require long-term residence in the region and the
collection of both longitudinal and qualitative primary data. Interestingly,
such a study was undertaken in the region between 1978 and 1983 (see
AIAS 1984). While research from that project was actively utilised in the
establishment of the Kunwinjku Association, disputation over the payment
of mining moneys was already a modus operandi that continued to have a
significant impact on the operations of the new Association.
The legislative context
The payment of mining moneys has a long history in the Northern
Territory context which needs to be briefly summarised. Many of the
contemporary problems and difficulties experienced by Aboriginal 'royalty'
associations arise from the origins of these payments and the ill-defined
nature of Aboriginal property rights in mining moneys. Questions have
been asked in the past about whether mining moneys are intended as
compensation or mineral rent, or both (Altman 1983, 1986, 1993), and
whether they are Aboriginal (private) or public moneys (Altman 1985).
This complex issue is of particular significance in the Nabarlek case
because Aboriginal people in West Arnhem Land have received both
agreement and 'areas affected' moneys. According to statute, at least, the
former are mineral rent and private, and the latter are probably
compensatory and public. However, many contending opinions continue to
hold sway about the nature of mining moneys. Certainly, the very strong
belief of many Aboriginal associations, communities, groups and
individuals and their representative organisations, is that all moneys paid in
respect to development on Aboriginal land are Aboriginal, and therefore
private, moneys. The issue remains an important one: expectations of how
public moneys should be administered and expended are not the same as
they are for private income.
Pre-land rights
Since legislative amendment to the Commonwealth Northern Territory
(Administration) Act 1952 and complementary amendment to the Northern
Territory Mining Ordinance 1953 and Aboriginals Ordinance 1953,
Aboriginal people have been distinguished in the benefits they receive
when mining occurs on Aboriginal land (then reserves). At that time it was
proposed that mining could be undertaken on reserves, but only on
payment of a double royalty that would be payable to Aboriginal people
via the Aborigines Benefits Trust Fund (ABTF). The reasons for this
special arrangement have been outlined in some detail elsewhere (Altman
1983: 3-9). What is of significance is that even in 1952, prior to the
operationalisation of these arrangements, anomalies were created. In
particular, while the double royalty was reserved for Aboriginal people,
there was no requirement that these moneys be paid directly to those
affected by the mine.
It was not till 1965 that the first agreement for mining on an Aboriginal
reserve, the Groote Eylandt Mining Company (GEMCO) Agreement was
completed. As stipulated, statutory royalties were paid to the ABTF at
double the standard rate (that is, at 2.5 per cent ad valorem), but in
addition, a negotiated royalty of 1.25 per cent was paid direct to Aboriginal
interests on Groote Eylandt via an agreement struck between the Church
Missionary Society and Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd (BHP). In
1968 the special Mining (Gove Peninsula Nabalco Agreement) Ordinance
was passed. This agreement ignored the double royalty requirement and
provided no additional payments whatsoever to Aboriginal people of the
Gove region. After the plaintiffs failed to halt mining at Gove in the case
Milirrpum and others v. Nabalco and the Commonwealth in 1971, Cabinet
decided to allow 10 per cent of statutory royalties paid to the ABTF with
respect to Nabalco to be paid to the local Yirrkala Dhanbul Association
from 1972. In 1973, a similar decision was made with respect to GEMCO
statutory royalties. It was not stipulated at that time if such payments were
compensation, and if they were, how they should be distributed or
expended.
The Aboriginal Land Rights Commission
The Woodward Aboriginal Land Rights Commission recommended that
the existing formula be changed and that 30 per cent (not 10 per cent) of
statutory royalties made with respect of a mine should be paid to
communities in areas affected by the mining operation. The new formula
also recommended that 40 per cent of statutory royalties be used to finance
Aboriginal land councils and 30 per cent be paid, in a broadly
compensatory manner, to or for the benefit of Aboriginal people in the
Northern Territory. Woodward (1974) recommended that communities in
areas affected be those located within 60 kilometres of a mine site. While
Woodward's 'letters patent' invited him to transfer mineral ownership to
Aboriginal land owners, he explicitly refused to make such a
recommendation. Rather, he emphasised that the payment of royalties to
areas affected were compensatory and were not mineral rent: as traditional
owners did not own the minerals he recommended that they should not
have any primacy in access to mining moneys. Instead, the clear emphasis
was that mining moneys should collectively benefit Northern Territory
Aboriginal people, not selectively privilege certain groups above others.
The land rights legislation
The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 maintained
much of the spirit of Woodward's recommendations and, in particular,
incorporated at s.64(3) a requirement that 30 per cent of statutory royalties
be paid to Aboriginal councils, incorporated groups or communities whose
members are the traditional owners of, or reside in, areas affected by a
resource development project. However, the extent of 'areas affected' was
not defined in statute, thereby creating enormous difficulties for land
councils in their negotiation of the financial aspects of mining agreements
and subsequent distribution of moneys. The statute also allowed land
councils to negotiate additional mining payments beyond statutory
royalties and these could be paid in accord with specific conditions laid
down in an agreement. One of the key statutory requirements in the Land
Rights Act is for land councils to act as intermediaries between developers
and traditional owners with respect to any commercial development on
Aboriginal land. A difficulty created by this statutory requirement is that
while mining agreements have to be negotiated directly with traditional
owners of the land, subsequently these traditional owners are not
necessarily treated as the primary or sole potential beneficiaries of an
agreement. This frequently places land councils, as intermediaries between
traditional owners and miners, in an invidious situation. It likewise places
potential Aboriginal beneficiaries, both traditional owners and residents of
'areas affected', in a competitive situation.
These difficulties are at the heart of many problems that have eventuated
with respect to the distribution and utilisation of mining moneys in the past
15 years. It is clear that from an Aboriginal perspective, mining moneys
belong primarily to traditional owners of the mine site. This is partly due to
the fact that they have been required to participate in negotiations and
approve agreements. But it is also due to the indigenous view that
resources extracted from the land belong to the traditional land owner:
Aboriginal people do not accept Crown ownership of minerals. On the
other hand, changed administrative arrangements since 1978, when the
ABTA (established as the royalties clearing house by the Land Rights Act)
became operational, have added further complications. In June 1978, the
Northern Territory became self-governing and ownership of all minerals
(except uranium) were transferred to the Northern Territory. From that
date, most mining royalties were paid to the Northern Territory Treasury
and the equivalents of these royalties were paid to the ABTA from
consolidated revenue. Statutory royalty equivalents became, in a legal
sense, public moneys. The considerable historical confusion over the nature
of mining moneys was thereby further exacerbated by the ambiguities
inherent in the concept of 'royalty equivalents' that are public moneys.
One problem created by this changed administrative arrangement is that
there continues to be a wide divergence between Aboriginal perceptions
that statutory royalties are Aboriginal moneys and private, and the politico-
legal view that these moneys are public and therefore require
accountability.3 An additional problem created is that under the Land
Rights Act there are now two potential types of mining payments: those
paid directly from mining companies to land councils to traditional owners
and people in areas affected (s.43 and s.44 payments), and those paid from
consolidated revenue (as equivalents) to the ABTA then to the land
councils, to Aboriginal councils, communities or incorporated groups in
areas affected. Accordingly, land councils have faced considerable
difficulties in interpreting and administering the array of complex and often
ill-defined mechanisms to be followed in negotiating mining agreements
and distributing moneys paid with respect to subsequent resource
development projects.
Key unresolved issues
As recently as 1991, the Industry Commission highlighted the absence of
clear property rights in minerals in the Northern Territory. Aboriginal
people do not own the minerals prior to extraction (ownership is vested in
the Crown), but do have a full right to a royalty paid as an equivalent and
the ability to negotiate for additional payments, a negotiation right
bestowed by the right to veto exploration (Altman and Peterson 1984).4The
Industry Commission (1991) referred to Aboriginal interests as having de
facto mineral ownership. Subsequently, the Industry Commission strongly
emphasised that mining moneys are a form of mineral rent rather than a
form of compensation, reinforcing Aboriginal views that the moneys are
private.
The Industry Commission recommended that Aboriginal interests (they
refer to traditional owners) should be given de jure mineral rights and a
greater share of mining moneys to provide greater incentive to allow
mineral exploration and mining on their land. The Industry Commission
recommended that 70 per cent of royalty equivalents, and presumably all
agreement moneys, should be paid to traditional owners of land on which a
mine might be located. This is entirely counter to the specific wording in
s.35(2) that communities, councils and incorporated groups whose
members are traditional owners of, or residents in, areas affected
(undefined) should receive 30 per cent of royalty equivalents from a mine.
The lack of clarity with regard to Aboriginal property rights in minerals has
important implications with respect to how mining moneys are utilised. As
noted above, since 1978 royalty equivalents paid to residents in areas
affected have come to be regarded by the Commonwealth as public moneys
because they are paid from consolidated revenue. On the other hand,
agreement payments are clearly not 'public1 in the sense that they are being
made by mining companies to land councils and then to Aboriginal
interests. However, as also noted, there continues to be a lack of
understanding of, and agreement about, these complex legislative and
administrative arrangements. This lack of resolution has hampered the
effective distribution of mining moneys and created ambiguity with respect
to monitoring the utilisation of these moneys which frequently cannot be
differentiated in the financial statements of royalty associations. It has also
created uncertainty about the exact role of the land councils in relation to
the subsequent monitoring of Aboriginal royalty associations. In the case of
mining moneys from Nabarlek, there was, initially, considerable confusion
within the NLC and amongst Aboriginal people in West Arnhem Land
concerning the different types of payments and the variable criteria for
their distribution.
Nabarlek Phase 1:1979-81
The initial phase in the payment of moneys in relation to mining at
Nabarlek dates from the signing of the QML Agreement on 22 March
1979, to the incorporation of the Kunwinjku Association in January 1982.
Much of the early history has been documented for over a decade (see
AIAS 1979, 1981, 1984; von Sturmer 1982; Altman 1983; Carroll 1983;
and Kesteven 1983) and is only briefly summarised here to provide
essential background.
The QML Agreement
The QML Agreement signed between the NLC and QML was problematic
from the outset. Unlike the Ranger Agreement completed with respect to
the nearby (and much larger) uranium mine at Jabiru in 1978, the QML
Agreement featured sizeable negotiated rental and up-front payments,
referred to as agreement moneys. Part of the rationale for such payments
that were to be channelled directly to traditional owners was to maximise
financial benefits from the Agreement to regional, rather than wider
Northern Territory Aboriginal, interests by by-passing the ABTA. (The
differences between the Ranger and QML Agreements have been discussed
in some detail by Altman 1983: 56-61.)
Administration of the QML Agreement faced a number of immediate
difficulties. Some were linked to technical aspects of the Agreement itself.
Agreement moneys that were expected to be the equivalent of an ad
valorem royalty rate of 2 per cent were to be distributed under s.35(3) of
the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 in accordance
with the Agreement. The Agreement stated under clauses 4.3c and 4.3d that
half of the agreement moneys were to be applied by the NLC for the
benefit of traditional owners of, and Aborigines interested in, the project
area (which comprised the Nabarlek mine site and Wunyu beach barge
landing) and that the other half was to be distributed to an incorporated
group comprising the traditional owners of land affected by the project.
The potential beneficiaries under these two clauses were not mutually
exclusive and their inclusion as beneficiaries was linked to the approach
taken by the NLC to definition of the 'area affected'.
The looseness of much of this legislative terminology created enormous
difficulties both for the NLC and Aboriginal people. In the early days of
the NLC's operation there was no register of traditional owners or land
interest register for the region (as then stipulated under the Land Rights
Act) and no clear delineation of land that might be affected by the project.
Potential beneficiaries of the Agreement (that is, traditional owners of all
areas affected by the project), furthermore, resided in communities
throughout Western Arnhem Land, including Croker and Goulburn Islands
and represented a culturally and linguistically diverse population. Almost
immediately, as the mine site was developed in 1980, these issues were
contested, with the traditional owners of the Nabarlek to Cahills Crossing
road (many of whom resided at Gunbalanya) arguing, quite legitimately,
that their land and their lives were also affected by the project (AIAS
1981).
Distribution of moneys : policy and practice
Prolonged negotiation over the QML Agreement in the face of considerable
regional opposition to the mine resulted in a strong expectation of
immediate financial benefit from both those who supported and opposed
the mine. The former group, and especially key traditional owners of the
mine site, had been courted by QML and were under the impression that
they were to receive direct and substantial payments in much the same way
as the non-Aboriginal person who held the original exploration licence
over the mine site. (These earlier payments were conceptually in the nature
of mineral rent and were directly tied to the value of minerals (Altman
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1983: 61)). The latter group, on the other hand, were seeking financial
compensation to offset anticipated negative impacts of the mine.
In a situation fraught with tensions between Aboriginal interests, conflict
between Commonwealth and Northern Territory Governments over
uranium policy and resource development, and with NLC staff
inexperienced in the interpretation and conduct of complex legislative
functions, the NLC did not develop a consistent policy or appropriate
mechanisms for disbursing mining moneys from the Agreement. Not
surprisingly, it responded to enormous political pressure from Aboriginal
interests in the region to distribute mining moneys. A combination of
factors, including wider governmental and public pressures on the NLC to
demonstrate that the Land Rights Act could facilitate mining activity, and
regional threats to establish a break-away land council, induced an over-
hasty response.
Rather than undertake the detailed, time-consuming research needed to
determine traditional ownership and the extent of 'affectedness' (now a
standard procedure), the NLC convened large meetings of people from the
region to consider distribution options. Attempts were made to explain the
meaning of the Agreement, but these foundered. In these early days of
administering the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976,
the difficulties presented in cross-cultural communication were only
gradually becoming apparent. This problem was exacerbated by the fact
that NLC staff assigned to undertake the task did not themselves
understand their statutory functions or the terms of the Agreement. In
particular, they misunderstood that payments needed to be made in
accordance with the Agreement under s.35(3) of the Aboriginal Land
Rights Act rather than to incorporated groups under s.35(2) of the Act.
Subsequently, in four distribution rounds made in 1979 and 1980, variable
and very inconsistent formulae were used (see Altaian 1983: 128). This
occurred in part because NLC staff sought direction at very large regional
meetings. Such meetings, with participants representing an estimated 1,200
to 1,400 potential beneficiaries, became a forum for interest group
lobbying. Some key individuals had undue influence over NLC staff and
members, while other leaders were extremely effective in representing their
particular Aboriginal constituencies. There was a high degree of
contestation at these meetings with resulting distributions being inequitable
and ad hoc.
Nabarlek Phase 1: assessment
The complexities of the QML Agreement, the absence of any formulated
policy, the lack of clear mechanisms to guide the distribution and
utilisation of mining moneys, and the absence of any monitoring of
expenditure has left a regional legacy that is evident today.
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Agreement moneys in the period 1979 to 1981 were distributed almost
exclusively in two ways: as cash payments to individuals and groups, or as
consumer goods, mainly vehicles (Kesteven 1983). At the time there was
considerable policy pressure from both the Commonwealth Government
via the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA), and from within the NLC
itself, to facilitate local Aboriginal self-determination. Accordingly, the
NLC allowed total discretion to regional meetings to decide how mining
moneys should be utilised.
Despite concern about the social impact of such distribution practice
articulated at the time in interim reports of the Social Impact of Uranium
Mining project (for example, AIAS 1979,1981), there was a total absence
of institutional checks and balances within either DAA or the NLC to
assess or alter such practice, even if only on the grounds of legal
inconsistency with provisions in the Agreement. For example, there was no
monitoring of clause 4.3c moneys by government or the NLC to ensure that
they were applied 'to the benefit' of recipients and there was no
incorporated group established as required under clause 4.3d of the QML
Agreement.
Nabarlek Phase 2: the Kunwinjku Association, 1982-88
The Kunwinjku Association was not established until January 1982, some
three years after the signing of the QML Agreement. The belated formation
of the Association was largely an attempt by the NLC and the DAA to
resolve the difficulties outlined above, and what was publicly perceived to
be an ongoing waste of mining moneys. However, the operation of the
Kunwinjku Association did not alleviate these problems. Rather, it
exacerbated them.
Structure and membership
The Association structure and its constitution were extremely complex (see
Altman 1983; Kesteven 1983; O'Faircheallaigh 1988a). Its organisational
structure was devised to receive and utilise both agreement and areas
affected moneys. The former were paid to traditional owners from three
'areas of interest' represented by separate sub-committees (Nabarlek,
Arguluk and Wunyu) under s.35(3); the latter were paid to the whole
region and dealt with by a separate overarching Aboriginal committee
within the Association.
This structure attempted to integrate into one umbrella organisation groups
identified as beneficiaries under the QML Agreement and communities that
could potentially be compensated with s.64(3) 'areas affected moneys'. The
wide definition given to the area affected resulted in an estimated
Association membership of land owners and residents of some 1,300 to
1,400 people, dispersed across West Arnhem Land. Neither the NLC nor
the Kunwinjku Association compiled a list of members. These factors
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alone made sound financial planning and decision making extremely
difficult.
Finances
During the period 1982-1987, the Association received $8.3 million. There
are extremely poor financial records available from the Association to
indicate how these receipts were expended. Large sums appear to have
been handed out as cash distributions. Overall, vehicles constituted by far
the largest single item of Aboriginal expenditure (at over $2 million). The
Association's total administrative costs amounted to a massive $2.8 million
or 34 per cent of its income (O'Faireheallaigh 1988b: 140,161).
In the mid-1980s the Association, under advice from its non-Aboriginal
management, took over QML's road contract, bought an airline, an abattoir,
a service station and a barge. However, these investments were poorly
assessed and by the end of 1986 each one had incurred substantial losses.
The Association also made losses on a number of large loans (some
obtained illegally by its inaugural non-Aboriginal manager) and on projects
initiated by management which were not for the benefit of Association
members.
The net assets of Kunwinjku Association at March 1988 when it was
legally wound up, were $893,449 - 10 per cent of receipts - and it had a
limited liability of $250,000 that was transferred to the NTOA. In 1988,
O'Faireheallaigh (1988b: 110-11) assessed the Association as owning
insufficient assets to guarantee a future income stream to its members.
The reasons for Kunwinjku's poor financial performance included its
complex and inappropriate structure; its widespread membership; lack of
financial management systems; difficulties in hiring and supervising high
calibre staff during its early years (the Association's first manager
subsequently absconded and defrauded the Association of a significant
amount of money); adverse precedents and conflicts generated by the
earlier history of disorderly distributions by the NLC of large amounts of
cash and vehicles; the impact of intense politicking by Aboriginal interests
within the distributive economy that had developed around QML mining
moneys; and the role of key Aboriginal players from Gunbalanya and other
Aboriginal people with no affiliation with land affected by the Nabarlek
mine', in making financial decisions.
Nabarlek Phase 2: assessment
Earlier research by the Social Impact of Uranium Mining project (AIAS
1984) noted the lack of experience in handling cash and addressing
financial issues amongst the Gunbalanya Aboriginal population. The
Association's overly complex structure and cumbersome membership
model created considerable logistical and planning problems for the
Association and raises the issue of whether members were able to
understand and use the Association effectively.
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Problems with the QML Agreement itself and confusion over the nature of
moneys paid out also impeded the Association's financial performance. The
financial decisions made by the Association were adversely influenced by
key Aboriginal figures, local politicking, poor management and inadequate
financial advice. Progressively, there appeared to be a total breakdown of
financial management and planning. The inconsistency in Association and
NLC decision making about distribution of moneys and membership left a
considerable legacy that hampered the Association's performance.
If areas affected moneys were, in part, seen to be compensation for
potential socioeconomic impacts related to mining at Nabarlek, then there
is no evidence that the Kunwinjku Association directed money to alleviate
those impacts. Agreement moneys primarily enabled a temporary increase
in the personal expenditure of some individuals, mainly on vehicles. The
Association's distribution mechanisms and expenditure regime seem to
have been responsible for great social upheaval, in terms of contestation
over distribution of moneys, rather than any alleviation of perceived
negative social impacts from mining.
The financial operation of the Kunwinjku Association raised important
questions about whether the financial benefits generated under the QML
Agreement had been equitably distributed and how the interests of future
generations of potential recipients should be taken into account. It also
raised issues concerning the potential role of the NLC in establishing
and monitoring such associations (AIAS 1984; Kesteven 1983;
O'Faircheallaigh 1988b).
Nabarlek Phase 3: The NTOA, 1988-93
There is no published research currently available on the history or
operation of the NTOA, though its history and role will be covered in a
forthcoming monograph by O'Faircheallaigh. Our analysis of the NTOA's
operation and financial performance is based primarily on extensive file
material made fully available by the NLC.
In the late 1980s, after a joint DAA/NLC review of the Kunwinjku
Association, there was growing consensus that the Kunwinjku Association
had to be wound up and that a new association with a smaller, but
specified, membership should be established to allow a fresh start. There
were four main reasons for this decision. First and foremost, the
Kunwinjku Association was not only insolvent, but had acquired massive
additional contingent liabilities following the purchase of Aramunda Air.
Second, it was recognised that the size of the Kunwinjku membership, and
especially its geographic dispersion, hampered its effectiveness. Third,
there was a belief (or hope) that if a new association were incorporated
under Commonwealth legislation (as required after amendment of the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and inclusion of
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s.35(12) in 1987, although interestingly amended again in 1990) it could be
held more financially accountable by the Office of the Registrar of
Aboriginal Corporations. Finally, there was growing recognition that the
future income stream from the Nabarlek mine was declining rapidly: it was
estimated in 1987 that only a further $1.6 million was forthcoming from
the mill that was to be decommissioned in 1988 (NLC file 97/174). There
was also a corresponding view that the Nabarlek core group, the more
immediately affected traditional owners, should be the ones to reap the
remaining financial benefit from the mine.
The NTOA was incorporated on 5th April 1988. It inherited the full
financial legacy of the Kunwinjku Association and on the 23rd September
1987, officially took over all investments and liabilities of the Kunwinjku
Trading Association which was wound up on the 3rd March 1988. An
estimated $13.8 million in mining moneys have been paid under the QML
Agreement and s.64(3) of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act over the 14 year
period 1979 to 1993. Of this, $1.45 million was paid in agreement moneys
prior to 1982, $8.3 million was paid to the Kunwinjku Association to 1987,
with an additional $1 million being held in a trust account by the NLC in
1988, and just over $3.3 million has been paid to the NTOA from 1988 to
1993. The NTOA's income for the period 1988-93 represented only about
25 per cent of the total income generated with respect to the Nabarlek
mine. Its future financial success was clearly encumbered from the
beginning.
The establishment of the NTOA should have provided an opportunity to
create a more appropriate organisational structure for the particularities of
the Nabarlek situation. However, in the event, the new Association's
Constitution was poorly structured by the NLC and DAA. There were
potentially positive initiatives such as the incorporation of the Association
under Commonwealth legislation, a less complicated distributional
mechanism, and a smaller membership. However, there remained a
vagueness about the geographic coverage of its financial operations. There
was frequent mention in the constitution of an undefined 'Oenpelli region'
and 'the region', the communities, groups and individuals of which were to
be the focus of Association activities. The NTOA may well have
experienced difficulties in delimiting its own financial orientation in line
with its newly restricted membership, when its Constitution appeared to
reinforce a 'Kunwinjku focus' on an undefined, wide region of potential
activity.
Membership
In reaction to the inclusive membership of the Kunwinjku Association and
the related problems in financial planning and management, the NLC
established rules for a more restricted NTOA membership (actual and
potential) by focusing on traditional owners as defined in die Aboriginal
Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 and applying it to the Nabarlek
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mine area. The Constitution defines traditional ownership for membership
purposes as:
the local descent group of Aboriginals of the Nabarlek Mine site who:
(a) have common spiritual affiliation to the Nabarlek mine site, being affiliations
that place the group under primary spiritual responsibility for the Nabarlek mine
site; and
(b) are entitled by Aboriginal tradition to forage as a right over the Nabarlek mine
site.
The effect was to substantially reduce membership of the new Association
to a total of 83 people, the precise identity of whom was listed in a
schedule attached to the Constitution. The 49 adults and 34 children came
from five 'clan' groups: Madjawarr 1 and Madjawarr 2, Murrwan, Mirrar
and Djalama. This membership was, nevertheless, greater than the 19
Nabarlek traditional owners identified in 1979 (Altman 1983: 127). The
expansion of the 'core group' from one clan group to five can be explained
perhaps as another Kunwinjku Association legacy: the effect of the
political negotiations and compromises required by the Nabarlek traditional
owners in trying to reduce membership from the previously wide coverage.
The Constitution refers to future membership for the descendants of
members, but specifies no bases or mechanisms whereby ongoing
membership of the Association could continue to be determined by the
current membership itself, as opposed to an outside agency. In the event,
some decisions regarding membership have been determined by the NLC,
while others have been made by senior land owners from the Association.
The former arrangement of calling upon the NLC to make an adjudication
may well have suited the Association membership, especially in
circumstances of local conflict.
Quasi-members
An issue associated with membership has arisen with respect to the
establishment of a supplementary list locally known as 'gift people'. This
list currently stands at 22 people, all from Gunbalanya, and has been
established as a system of preference primarily handed out by the NTOA
Chairperson. These people have regularly received the same cash
distributions as constitutionally-scheduled members and have requested
and received vehicles. A 'gift person' is also currently on the NTOA
Committee.
The continuing impact of regional Aboriginal politicking generated by the
Kunwinjku Association membership model is inevitably apparent in the
quasi-membership status of these 'gift people'. Their status can be seen as a
strategic and legitimate Aboriginal mechanism whereby certain people
excluded from membership in the new Association have been
diplomatically 'incorporated1 and appeased. It may well be that these people
are also connected by close genealogical, ceremonial and territorial
affiliations to the core groups of NTOA members. Certainly, their presence
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as additional beneficiaries is a reflection of the considerable pressure that
has been placed upon the NTOA Chairperson for access to the
Association's funds.
The NTOA Constitution contains no provision for, or controls over, such a
list of people, and given the previous problems in distributing Kunwinjku
funds, it could be argued that it is contrary to the financial interests of the
NTOA. Given the ongoing Aboriginal tensions apparent within the
distributive economy over access to mining moneys, the effective
expansion of Association membership should occur according to
commonly understood and agreed upon procedures. Current NTOA
members have found themselves in an invidious position, being required to
cope with inevitable pressures generated by the scaling down of their
membership. A set of more consistent procedures for dealing with the
difficult issue of membership would help alleviate the enormous pressures
placed on senior owners and Association office bearers.
Decision-making processes
The main management mechanism established by the Constitution is a
Committee, made up of four members - a chair, deputy chair, secretary and
treasurer - holding office for one year and elected by a majority of
members voting at an annual general meeting of the Association. This
Committee was not operationalised until late 1991, despite a requirement
that it be set up within two months of incorporation. It is not clear if office
bearers were elected at a full membership meeting. The Committee is given
'sole discretion1 to distribute any property and income to any, or all,
members of the Association. The only constitutional direction given to the
Committee in asserting its considerable discretionary power is that it must
'reflect the interest of the members of the Association as a whole'.
However, there are no checks and balances to encourage such
accountability to the membership besides the normal opportunities to vote
out office bearers at annual or special general meetings. During its period
of recent operation, the Committee's major decisions have focused on
vehicle purchase and maintenance. It has not developed into an effective
management body for the Association, except in this role.
In its short period of operation, the Committee has had as members, people
who are not listed as Association members. Again, their involvement
signals the Association leadership's continuing social and political
indebtedness to a wider Aboriginal network. It is a major oversight that the
Constitution does not specifically stipulate that the members of the
Committee be members of the Association,or even Aboriginal.
The current Chairperson has had a special and considerable role in the
financial direction taken by the Association. At an early stage in the
Association's affairs it was decided by the NLC that the Chairperson should
operate a separate account, with sole discretion, for use as a 'Community
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Trust Fund'. Regular and large sums of money put into this fund have
benefited a relatively small group close to the Chairperson. The NLC has
continued to act 'on instructions' from this person in the day-to-day
administration of the Association's funds. While this influence is no doubt
due to the Chairperson's widely recognised position as the senior traditional
owner for the mine site, it is not clear why such discretionary financial
powers have been given to one person, especially with respect to s.64(3)
areas affected moneys. Certainly these powers have been a contributing
factor in exacerbating the inordinate pressures placed on the Chairperson
by members and non-members alike for access to cash and vehicles.
It is only at the instigation of the current NTOA Manager that the
Committee has been formally operationalised; Committee financial
decisions and policies have been systematically recorded; Committee
minutes maintained; the membership informed of decisions via an
irregular, but informative, newsletter; and accurate records of expenditure
and distributions of cash kept. Under recent NLC management, the
financial administration of the Association has improved considerably;
systems for maintaining financial records have been established; and
mechanisms for receiving and acting upon agreed authorisations have been
negotiated. It would have been to the Association's considerable benefit if
these management structures and processes had been established at the very
beginning of its operation, especially in light of the earlier and acute
shortcomings of the Kunwinjku Association.
Overview of financial performance
An NLC assessment of the NTOA at the end of 1989 noted that it had 'a
number of substantial investments and derived substantial income from
those investments'. In fact, this was not the case (see Table 1). At the end
of 1989 the Association had net assets of just $1.2 million, consisting
mostly of income received for that year (see Table 2). From its first full
year of operations the NTOA experienced a rapidly declining income
stream. In 1990, milling stopped and in 1991 the last of QML's stockpiled
ore was sold. From 1992, Agreement payments declined markedly.
From March 1988 until 30 June 1993 the NTOA received $3.3 million (see
Table 1). Section 64(3) royalty equivalents comprised only 25 per cent of
this total, with the Agreement payments amounting to 40 per cent. There
are two features of this income. First, of the total income of $11.6 million
that had been distributed between 1982 and 1993, NTOA total income
represented only one-third; the remainder had already been distributed and
expended by the Kunwinjku Association. Second, as with Kunwinjku, it
was made up of two major types of income: negotiated agreement
payments and areas affected moneys. The difference is that in the NTOA
no attempt has been made to distinguish one form of payment from the
other, counter to requirements in both the QML Agreement and in statute.
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a. Interest income is generated from member's accumulated funds; its
members funds are 13.2 per cent.



























presentation as a proportion of
10.3 per cent, 21.4 per cent and 13.3 per cent for each year K
lease payments from the Northern Territory Department of Mines
and Energy, miscellaneous income and a one-off payment of $352,753 from QML in relation to ELA
2508. In 1990, $144,044 was recouped by the NLC owing to overpayment to traditional owners of
ELA 2508 who were not members of the NTOA.
Source: NTOA Corporation, financial statements for the years ended 30 June 1989,1990,1991,1992 and
1993.








































a. Members funds at 30 June 1989 comprised of members surplus for the period ($330,728) plus total
assets of the Kunwinjku Association ($1,143,449) minus contingent liabilities of the Kunwinjku
Association ($250,000). In February 1990 it was established by Court Order that these liabilities
totalled $324.026.
Source: NTOA Corporation, financial statements for the years ended 30 June 1989,1990,1991.1992 and
1993.
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When the NTOA was established it inherited the assets and liabilities of the
Kunwinjku Association and committed itself to maintain an investment of
$1 million held in a Westpac Investment Account for three years. As can be
seen in Table 2, members funds of at least $1 million were maintained by
the NTOA until 1991-92. However, the NTOA does not appear to have
devised a consistent financial policy to only spend a proportion of its
income. The data on income and expenditure in Table 2 varied from 63 to
76 per cent for the period 1988-89 to 1990-91. However, in 1991/92, when
income declined rapidly, expenditure increased. Overall, in the period since
its incorporation, the NTOA has expended more than it has received. More
importantly for its financial future, in the 1991-92 financial year the NTOA
started running down its reserves to finance continued expenditure.
It can be argued that NTOA's income was effectively 'too little, too late'.
But also, in terms of its subsequent use of the continuing, though smaller,
income stream, the NTOA has been unable to break away from the
precedent of a financial policy heavily skewed in favour of expenditure set
by Kunwinjku. As a result, the NTOA is currently in a difficult financial
situation. It has limited income and unless further mining agreements are
negotiated, or expenditure is frozen, it is likely that the Association will
cease to be financially viable.
While alternate scenarios can be easily proposed with hindsight, it would
have been possible for the NTOA to merely expend its investment income
for a year or two and build up its capital base to an extent that would have
allowed sustainable, though limited, expenditure in the longer term. The
fact that the Association did not pursue such a strategy indicates inadequate
financial planning. However, as will be argued below, there were also
political, organisational and cultural factors that reinforced the almost
exclusive emphasis on expenditure.
Expenditure policy and practice
Table 3 details the major areas of expenditure, simplified to three
categories, undertaken by the NTOA from early 1988 to mid 1993. Over
that period, the Association expended a total of approximately $3.5 million.
Overall, as with the Kunwinjku Association, the purchase and maintenance
of vehicles accounted for the majority of expenditure: 57 per cent over the
five year period and between 32 and 76 per cent each year. Cash
distributions to members and 'gift' people accounted for 28 per cent of
expenditure over the period, although there are indications of a rapid
decline in such distributions since 1988-89. Overall, 85 per cent of funds
were expended on vehicles, vehicle maintenance, a house, boats and cash
distributions.
The division of expenditure categories above are largely linked to
accounting conventions in the NTOA's financial accounts. The remaining
12 per cent of expenditure under the 'other expenses' category was spread
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across a myriad of smaller items including individual medical expenses,
donations to the Gunbalanya school, payments for cultural events such as
funerals, additional debts of the Kunwinjku Association and the
administrative costs of running the NTOA. One positive feature initiated by
NLC management in recent years has been the decline in the costs of
operating the Association, from 34 per cent of income for Kunwinjku, to
less than 8 per cent of income for the NTOA.
Table 3. Nabarlek Traditional Owners Association expenditure 1989-































































a. Of this amount $74,026 were additional liabilities of the Kunwinjku Association.
b. Approximately $100,000 to build a house for the chairperson.
c. $61,955 of this to the Hannah Girrabul Community Trust.
Source: NTOA Corporation, financial statements for the years ended 30 June 1989,1990,1991,1992 and
1993. The qualifying notes above are necessary because the NTOA changed accountants in 1991/92 and
slightly different accounting conventions are now used.
Overall, the Association did not expend any of its income on establishing
outstations, enterprises, educational scholarships, providing community or
outstation amenities and essential services, purchasing land or other non-
depreciating resources, or any of the other activities listed in its
Constitution. The contribution of $18,500 to the Gunbalanya school seems
to have been the extent of its benevolent involvement in the wider
Gunbalanya community. Comments made ten years ago by the AIAS
(1984: 147), about the 'limited set of objectives' apparent amongst people
in the region, remain appropriate to NTOA's expenditure activities: they
have remained short-term and oriented to consumer goods and cash
distribution. Association expenditure has also focused primarily on the
immediate consumption needs and priorities of individuals, as opposed to
21
those of wider social groups and organisations within Gunbalanya or
beyond.
Investment policy and practice
The NTOA's discernible investment practice appears to have been aimed at
generating investment income in the short-term from a conservative
portfolio held primarily with established trading banks. When the
Association was formed in 1988, it was advised by the DAA and NLC to
purchase blue-chip business property in the Darwin Central Business
District with established long-term tenants. Such a sound investment would
have generated rental income in the long term and would not have been
immediately convertible to cash. However, this option was rejected by
senior traditional owners. This is hardly surprising given that one of the
underlying pressures behind the formation of the NTOA was the failed
business enterprises of the Kunwinjku Association that made it insolvent.
As noted above, $1 million of Kunwinjku assets was retained by the NLC
in a trust account when the Kunwinjku Association was dissolved and
invested as a lump sum. However, this was not formally established by the
NTOA as a long-term investment commitment: from 1992, when
expenditure priorities exceeded income, this investment was run down,
despite warnings by the NTOA Manager and the NLC about the
Association's worsening financial situation.
The major investment innovation by the NTOA was the creation of a
Children's Fund that is very similar to that established by the nearby
Gagudju Association (Altman 1983: 123). Upon reaching the age of 18
years each young adult member is given a sum of money, currently in the
vicinity of $9,000. Through this investment account the Association aims
to provide future generations with some financial benefit from the mining
Agreement. While individual benefits are small, the Fund represents an
important commitment to intergenerational equity in respect to the receipt
of mining moneys. In 1993, about $400,000 remained invested in this
Fund. However, as Association income receipts have declined, this Fund
has come under pressure as a source of money for further expenditure. As
the only remaining Association investment, the Fund is potentially the
NTOA's only lasting financial achievement. Even so, while the Fund
generates income paid to members at age 18 years, it is reported that the
lump sum received is usually expended immediately by recipients and their
kin. As such, it is debatable whether the Fund is any more 'productive' in
terms of longer-term financial security than the other cash distributions
made by the Association. Overall, the NTOA has not maintained a long-
term commitment to investment.
The Toyota debate
The NTOA's financial performance is largely characterised by its
involvement in the purchase and maintenance of vehicles. This has featured
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significant expenditures on new and used vehicles, ongoing costs for
repairs, frequent sale and swapping of vehicles with considerable loss,
rapid depreciation and frequent complete destruction of vehicles, as well as
inadequate records. In one month alone, in 1992, the Association spent
$19,500 on vehicle repairs. The pressure on the Chairperson and Manager,
from members and non-members alike, to finance vehicle purchases and
repairs has been constant. Any efforts by the Committee to establish means
to circumvent this pressure have been overridden by the difficulties they
face in resisting the persistent claims of many people.
Vehicles undoubtedly have served a positive purpose for individuals and
families in providing transport for a many of activities. However, there
have been important disadvantages for the Association as a whole, many of
which have been pointed out to the Committee by the current manager. In
particular, the demands on management to supervise vehicle purchase and
repairs and to monitor resales and swaps was cited as being partly
responsible for the increased Association administration costs submitted by
the NLC. The uncontrolled sale of vehicles for immediate cash gain has
also meant large losses. Arguably, vehicles have not provided lasting
benefit to individuals or families owing to their rapid deterioration and
frequent wreckage (few were used for transport to outstations, according to
the Demed Outstation Resource Centre). Other investment or expenditure
opportunities were forgone owing to the large amounts spent on buying and
maintaining vehicles; and vehicles have not benefited all members equally
as they have been unevenly distributed. Some members have had
replacement vehicles every year, others have had several vehicles in any
one year and yet others have had none.
In the 1980s, the ABTA was criticised for its large expenditures on
vehicles, accounting in 1982 for some 70 per cent of grants (Altman 1985:
39). The ABTA was then cynically referred to as 'the Toyota Trust
Account1. The name could also be applied to the NTOA. There continues to
be debate about this issue. The Aboriginal need for vehicles to gain access
to remote outstation communities and to service centres, to continue
subsistence production activities, and for social and ceremonial reasons is
apparent and considerable. There is also the very real issue of the right of
individuals and the Association to determine the nature of their
expenditure. This is linked, in turn, to the unresolved matter of whether
mining moneys (and which part of those moneys) are public or private. An
important question, not only for outside monitoring agencies, but also for
the Association itself, nevertheless remains: should large amounts of
money continue to be directed towards the recurrent and high costs of
vehicles which depreciate rapidly on rough terrain under heavy use?
While social benefits may have accrued to NTOA individuals and families
because of greater access to transportation, overall, expenditure on vehicles
has been excessive and detrimental to the Association's financial viability.
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Together with its failure to maintain any investment regime, vehicle
expenditure has left the Association financially vulnerable. The current
Association (or any future Association) will need a system of formalised
structural checks and balances (constitutional and managerial) if it wishes
to establish a controlled and consistent vehicle expenditure policy.
Nabarlek Phase 3: assessment
Phase 3 is still under way, but already there are indications that the specific
factors that resulted in the NLC's attempt to recast the Kunwinjku
Association into the NTOA have continued to hamper the new
Association's effective financial performance. Despite the NLC's efforts to
provide managerial and financial advice to the Association, discussions
held with some Association members confirm that expenditure focused on
the same pattern of vehicle purchase and cash distributions to individuals,
that has occurred with Nabarlek mining moneys since 1979, and has been
extremely difficult to change. The precedents set during the early phase of
the QML Agreement have created entrenched expectations of continuing
cash distributions and reinforced the view that expenditure on vehicles is
the major function of the NTOA. The need to establish investments,
expressed by some members, is weighted against this legacy and the
Kunwinjku Association's very poor investment performance, and has failed
to replace these expenditure priorities. These tensions continue to affect
financial decisions made by the NTOA. In particular, it appears that the
Committee is keen to avoid further conflict.
Until recently the Association has had no clear policy guidelines or
procedures by which it managed its financial affairs. Informal, ad hoc
decision-making arrangements were the norm. The absence of procedures
in its early period of operation has meant that in practice, there have been
frequent contradictions in decisions about resource allocations. More recent
attempts by the NTOA Manager to formulate short-term financial policy
and associated decision-making procedures, have continued to be
undermined by the precedents of the past, and in particular, by the intense
Aboriginal politicking for immediate financial benefit.
For the Association to have had a successful investment performance,
specific guidelines for investment would have been needed in its
Constitution. Indeed, one member made just such a suggestion to us. To
date, the Association's Committee has been unable to give priority to the
accumulation of financial assets as a long-term objective in the face of
intense pressure to do otherwise. Its present limited reserves mean that the
NTOA will not be able to take the fullest economic advantage of future
opportunities afforded by the anticipated transfer of remaining mine site
infrastructure assets in 1995.
The NTOA's financial vulnerability has been exacerbated, until recently, by
poor investment advice and management support. It is crucial that the
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Association's management has financial experience and skills to enable
them to provide sound advice on investment and expenditure alternatives,
or at least to be able to confidently seek out such advice from appropriate
sources. These areas of expertise and management support are vital to an
association, such as the NTOA, whose membership remains largely
inexperienced in financial matters.
The NTOA is a small association in terms of its membership and has
limited local political influence. Its marginal status in Aboriginal political
terms has, at times, left it vulnerable to cross-cutting alliances and
cleavages within the region. Seen in the light of the problems inherited
from Kunwinjku, the pressure of regional Aboriginal politics, and the rapid
decline in income, the NTOA has had little room to manoeuvre. Even so, it
can be argued that in the absence of any investment strategy and owing to
an entrenched preference for expenditure, the Association has failed to
secure any longer-term financial benefits from the receipt of mining
moneys. Certainly, the absence of any sustained investment activity must
be viewed as a significant lost opportunity both for members and future
generations. Importantly, there has been little apparent equity in the
distribution of resources: some members have simply missed out in
comparison to others.
Policy issues and implications
This case study of the economic impact of payment of mining moneys
from the QML uranium mine at Nabarlek is replete with important policy,
administrative and legislative issues. These have implications for the West
Arnhem region, as well as for other Aboriginal groups in Australia.
Mining moneys: benefits and beneficiaries
If mining moneys are intended as compensation for adverse social and
cultural impacts, then it is clear that these moneys have not been used to
alleviate perceived social impacts, or establishing an economic base from
which to generate continuing income after the cessation of the Nabarlek
mine. While the NTOA has given some very limited assistance for cultural
activities (primarily for funerals), support for local enterprises, outstation
development, the establishment of community amenities, and the multitude
of other community-oriented objectives listed in its Constitution has been
absent. Clearly, association objectives and the geographic area of activity
need to be specified and targeted to realistic and achievable ends.
Otherwise, small associations like the NTOA will always be vulnerable to
widespread competing objectives, without appropriate mechanisms
available for exerting their own financial control.
One of the critical shortcomings of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern
Territory) Act 1976 is that the regional area affected remains undefined. In
such circumstances there is a high likelihood of intense regional politicking
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and potential for disputation. The nexus between traditional owners of the
mine site and areas affected by the mine in a physical sense, and
communities whose members reside in these affected areas, has never been
resolved. This can be- especially problematic if traditional owners are
politically marginalised in their current place of residence. In the case
examined here there has been enormous vacillation in targeting
beneficiaries from both the Agreement and royalty equivalents. While the
more recent focus has been on traditional owners of the Nabarlek mine site,
this solution is apparently counter to both the QML Agreement and s.35(2)
of the Land Rights Act that specifically states that areas affected moneys
are to be applied to Aboriginal corporations whose members are the
traditional owners of, or residents in, areas affected by mining operations.
Recent practice has reinforced the Aboriginal perspective that all mining
moneys belong to traditional owners and that such moneys are to be spent
at their discretion. The area of geographic coverage and the specification of
beneficiaries for particular types of payments need to be more fully
addressed before future royalty associations are established.
It was noted at the outset that the focus of the research reported here was
the payment of mining moneys with respect to the Nabarlek uranium mine.
However, it cannot be overlooked that 70 per cent of the mining royalty
equivalents transferred to the ABTA from consolidated revenue in respect
of QML are paid to interests outside the area affected. In particular, QML
royalty equivalents have funded Aboriginal land councils in their statutory
functions (including claiming Aboriginal land and managing Aboriginal
land) and have been utilised to, or for, the benefit of Aboriginal people
throughout the Northern Territory.
There is an Aboriginal viewpoint, outlined previously, that the payment of
these moneys is mineral rent and that its distribution outside areas affected
is inequitable. It should also be recalled that earlier reviews of the ABTA
emphasised its high rate of expenditure on vehicles (Altman 1985). It
might be a little inconsistent and patronising to expect the Kunwinjku
Association and NTOA not to expend what its members perceive as their
financial resources on vehicles, when they are aware that others are
expending 'their1 resources on identical goods via the ABTA. Similarly,
there have been positive external economies from the QML uranium mine
for wider Aboriginal interests who have not borne any social disruptions
associated with mining. It needs to be recognised that from a regional
Aboriginal perspective, the wider distribution of royalty equivalents under
the existing statutory formula further complicates an already complex
royalty mosaic.
Other economic issues
It is apparent that in the disputation over the dispersal of mining moneys
and associated administrative concerns, there has been a very evident
absence of focus on other important economic commitments made by
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QML in the Agreement. In particular, after the conclusion of the Social
Impact of Uranium Mining project (AIAS 1984), there is no evidence that
there has been any monitoring of employment and training guarantees
specified in the Agreement, or any other social impacts. The major
emphasis of external agencies like the NLC and DAA (now the Aboriginal
and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)) has been on controlling
'conspicuous' expenditure by the Kunwinjku Association and NTOA; and
on monitoring environmental impacts. The urgent need for investment in
human capital has been largely overlooked.
OTaircheallaigh (1988a) has documented the shortcomings in sections of
the Agreement dealing with employment issues and the attempts by QML
to recruit local Aboriginal labour. Our attempts to gain access to more
recent employment records proved unsuccessful. There is a prevailing view
articulated at Gunbalanya by local potential employers, that while the
licenced social club remains open twice a day during the working week, it
will be impossible to recruit sufficient Aboriginal labour for township
employment opportunities, let alone opportunities outside the town. The
issue of employment and training does not appear to have been consistently
monitored by the NLC which, as a signatory to the QML Agreement, has
no data or records on Aboriginal employment, training or enterprises
associated with the Nabarlek mine. Similarly, it appears that the NTOA has
only erratically pursued the potential economic opportunities available via
the Agreement.
Expenditure versus investment
There is always a tension, especially for poor people, between current
expenditure and deferred expenditure (or investment) for the future. The
expenditure practices associated with Nabarlek mining moneys from the
outset emphasised regional distribution of resources, either as vehicles or
cash. The opinion was voiced by some NTOA members that because
members have been historically involved in large distributions and
expenditures, they will exert considerable pressure for such expenditure to
continue.
In these circumstances, it is highly unlikely that the NTOA Committee
could successfully have maintained an investment fund or curtailed cash
distributions or expenditure on vehicles, even though they haveattempted
to do so on a number of occasions. This indicates the need for statutory
sanctions and/or association rules that specify a financial policy. The
current financial policy of a number of royalty associations in die Northern
Territory specifies that at least 50 per cent of income must be invested.
Statutory or constitutional guidelines (as found in North America and in
New South Wales land rights legislation) are essential, as is expert
financial advice, especially if concern exists among members about the
risks associated with investment.
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It is certainly a rational economic decision to choose to spend now if there
are excessive doubts about future access to resources and if there are high
levels of socioeconomic disadvantage. However, even the most cursory
assessment of the impact of the propensity for immediate expenditure and
cash distributions reveals that little has been achieved in the alleviation of
poverty amongst NTOA members.
The NTOA has had little room to manoeuvre. Even so, it is clear that since
1988 the Association has failed to secure any long-term benefits from the
receipt of mining moneys. Unlike the adjacent Gagudju Association, the
NTOA has not purchased any regional tourism infrastructure, partly
because no clear opportunities or concessions existed in the West Arnhem
Land region in contrast to Kakadu National Park. Nevertheless, an
investment portfolio that prioritised relatively liquid assets made the option
of shifting from investment to expenditure all too easy for the NTOA
Committee. Some strategic investment advice and leadership (either from
within or outside the region) was, and continues to be, urgently required.
The NLC should not take on the sole burden of monitoring and supplying
financial advice to the NTOA and other Aboriginal royalty associations.
There is a clear need for a federation of royalty associations which could
provide a forum for information sharing about financial and management
options. There is also a need for utilisation of financial expertise, available
on a commercial basis, in the market place.
The issue of the opportunity cost of the mining moneys stream foregone
looms large, especially as an intergenerational equity issue. While it
remains unclear, given the nature of the QML Agreement, what could have
been achieved and how realistic a productive investment scenario would
have been in the West Arnhem context, in the absence of secured
investment and financial planning, the NTOA has limited future options.
The role of external agencies
What was, and is, the legitimate role of organisations like the NLC and
other government departments like DAA in relation to 'royalty'
associations? There can be little doubt that the NLC, DAA, and the other
government departments both Territory and Commonwealth, have had
responsibilities of varying kinds for closely monitoring the performance of
'royalty' associations. The NLC and DAA in particular, have played an
ongoing part in decisions made about the establishment and reformation of
association structures and membership. At the same time, the
Commonwealth Government policy of self-determination, strongly
supported by both organisations, has prevented them taking too great an
active role in association affairs. However, it could be argued that it is
irresponsible to maintain a hands-off approach under the guise of self-
determination, self-management, or regional 'empowerment'. For it must be
asked if, in circumstances such as those of the Kunwinjku Association and
the NTOA, Aboriginal people have ever been in a position to assert
financial self-determination. The legacy of the QML Agreement's
shortcomings, regional politicking, early inadequate management and poor
financial advice have seriously hampered effective control of Association
affairs by its membership, and at the very least, have impeded the
emergence of informed decision-making by the Committee. Arguably, the
grounds for Association self-determination have been weakened by the
ambiguous role of the NLC in matters of Association financial
management. There may well be a need for the NLC to seek clearer
functions and establish policy guidelines in this complex area.
In the Kunwinjku Association and NTOA cases, a host of monitoring and
support agencies clearly failed to exercise adequate care, including (in no
particular order) the Northern Territory Registrar-General's Department in
Darwin, the Office of the Registrar of Aboriginal Corporations in Canberra,
DAA (and, since 1989 ATSIC), the NLC and Ministers for Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Affairs. External agencies may have cause to directly
intervene when required, although it is difficult to clearly identify an
independent arbiter to decide when intervention is justified or needed. It is
also difficult to determine which agency has responsibility over particular
issues. Even so, during the history of the QML Agreement, the NLC, DAA
and various government Ministers have seen good and substantial reasons
for intervening to assist in the resolution of difficulties encountered by
Aboriginal Association members. Rather than such involvement being
initiated in response to crises situations, a more formalised and constructive
role, in particular for the NLC, might prove to be of considerable assistance
to such associations. The more recent involvement of the NLC inproviding
stable and consistent financial administration for the NTOA has confirmed
the potentially constructive role that the NLC could perform for individual
associations or for a federation of such bodies. Such a role might more
effectively establish the grounds for association self-determination.
Afuture for the NTOA?
Despite the fact that the NTOA's net assets are now very limited, there are
still some strategic investment decisions that it can make. Of particular
significance, is the forthcoming transfer of remaining mine infrastructure at
Nabarlek to the NTOA in 1995. Remaining assets include an all-weather
sealed airstrip, currently vacant accommodation previously used by the
mine workforce, and other buildings. No members of the NTOA reside in
the immediate vicinity of the mine site, but consideration needs to be given
by the Association to how these remaining assets will be utilised: for
example, as the basis for an Aboriginal community, a tourism enterprise,
for the Demed Outstation Resource Centre, or some other purpose.5 It is
questionable whether the NTOA can create a niche for itself in the regional
political economy, primarily because of its poor financial position and its
past record. The hopeful option being considered by NTOA members is
that current exploration on Exploration Licence Application 2508 will
realise commercial uranium prospects that will result in a new mine, future
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milling at Nabarlek and a new stream of mining moneys. Such reliance
immediately raises issues of royalty dependence. If such a scenario were to
eventuate, then it is essential that more effective mechanisms are instituted
to both direct and monitor mining moneys.
A final comment: post-Mabo implications
In the post-Mabo policy environment there are growing indigenous
demands for compensation and rent when major resource development
projects are established on land held under native title. Prior to establishing
institutional arrangements for transferring mining moneys to indigenous
interests, it would be instructive to consider the difficulties encountered in
the Nabarlek case. As our research indicates there are continuing problems
that still require urgent attention.
The same distributional, monitoring, administrative and financial issues
that have been highlighted in this case study will arise with respect to
native title. For example, under the recent native title legislation,
compensation may be paid to corporate Aboriginal groups, but non-native
title holders might also receive compensation on a regional criteria (Altman
1994). The experience of the NTOA suggests that it would be preferable to
have a statutory stipulation of the purposes to which compensation moneys
can be applied. The issues of intergenerational equity and distributive
equity that have been highlighted here will also need to be addressed with
respect to any payment of public money under native title legislation.
Furthermore, in terms of their recently extended representational functions
under the Native Title Act 1993, it is likely that Northern Territory land
councils may find themselves in situations where they have to negotiate
and monitor the financial interests of both traditional owners and native
title holders, as members of complex associations that could include both
types of owners. This additional potential complication suggests that
statutory requirements to oversight the activities of royalty associations
might be welcomed.
Notes
1. The term 'royalty association' is not entirely appropriate because most receive
mining agreement moneys and rents as well as statutory royalty equivalents.
2. Altman met with the NTOA Committee and Manager to present and discuss
research findings and recommendations at Jabiru and Gunbalanya on 28
September 1993 and with NLC staff in Darwin on 5 October 1993.
3. For a fairly detailed discussion of this debate, especially in relation to mining
royalty equivalents see the Report on the Review of the Aboriginals Benefit Trust
Account (and Related Financial Matters) in the Northern Territory Land Rights
Legislation (Altman 1985).
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4. Up until January 1990 when the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act
1976 was amended, the ABTA was not guaranteed full royalty equivalents owing
to the existence of different royalty regimes specified in the Land Rights Act and
operating in the Northern Territory after 1982. Today, consolidated revenue pays
the full equivalents of any statutory royalties paid to the Northern Territory
(except with respect to uranium) for mining on Aboriginal land. The remaining
exception is royalties paid with respect to the Ranger Uranium Mine: 5.5 per cent
ad valorem is levied on Energy Resources of Australia by the Commonwealth,
but only 4.25 per cent is paid to the ABTA.
5. In July 1993, just after our visit to the Nabarlek mine site, Homeswest in Western
Australia auctioned all buildings at the mining town of Koolyanobbing. Total
sales realised just over $200,000. This indicates that mine infrastructure may have
more value in situ than on the open market
Appendix
Executive summary and recommendations to the Northern Land Council
1. This report has been commissioned by the Northern Land Council (NLC) to
address concern about the economic impacts on Aboriginal people in areas affected by
the closure of a major resource development project and the loss of an income stream
paid with respect to QML uranium mine at Nabarlek in Western Arnhem Land.
2. Our preliminary research indicates that, at one level, the closure of the Nabarlek
uranium mine will have limited direct economic impact on the members and quasi-
members of the NTOA. This is primarily because resources have been expended to
meet immediate needs for vehicles and cash. Members will, no doubt, miss access to a
ready source of additional and discretionary income, and some families in particular
will need to curtail domestic expenditure owing to a sudden reduction in access to cash.
However, there are no indications that long-term economic status will be adversely
affected, as there are few indicators of a sustained improvement in lifestyle owing to
access to mining moneys. In other words, the generally low economic status of most
Aboriginal members of the Association remains unchanged.
3. A small number of people will experience greater difficulty in gaining access to
specialist health services, in travelling to ceremonies and funerals, and in visiting
relatives. These more personal day-to-day financial realities associated with diminishing
access to mining moneys will be of significance to many Association members.
Ongoing impact assessment, detailed financial records and a long-term field presence
would be required to assess social impacts at this level. We can only conclude that,
overall, a period of Aboriginal reliance on welfare and government programs has been
supplemented for a decade with additional discretionary resources paid by QML and via
royalty equivalents payments paid from the ABTA to regional interests. The cessation
of mining will most likely see a return to the previous welfare regime.
4. If mining moneys are intended as compensation for adverse social and cultural
impacts, then it is clear that these moneys have not been used in any manner associated
with alleviating such social impacts, or establishing an economic base from which to
generate continuing income after the cessation of the Nabarlek mine.
5. The absence of any lasting positive impacts on the regional economy from the
resources transferred in relation to the Nabarlek uranium mine represents an important
lost opportunity. While similar lost opportunities have occurred elsewhere in regional
Australia, there is a lingering sense that more capable and stringent management of
mining moneys could have created longer-term economic development opportunities in
the region. It must be recognised though that the Aboriginal component of the West
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Arnhem Land regional economy is narrowly based and there are limited commercial
opportunities here in marked contrast to nearby Kakadu National Park. Only time will
tell if this lost opportunity is unique, or whether it is to be repeated when further mines
are established in the region.
6. The basis for the difficulties encountered in West Arnhem Land in utilising
mining moneys to develop an economic base are major shortcomings in existing
institutional and legislative frameworks. In particular, die Aboriginal Land Rights
(Northern Territory) Act 1976 has established ill-defined property rights in relation to
mining on Aboriginal land and associated mining moneys. Subsequently, there has been
little consensus as to whether mining moneys paid to traditional owners or residents of
areas affected by a mining development are mineral rent or compensation. The potential
role of the NLC in clarifying these complex issues on behalf of current and future
royalty associations is crucial.
Recommendation A: It is imperative that in future mining agreements and royalty
association structures, the mechanisms by which, and purposes for which, mining
moneys are to be expended are clearly specified.
Recommendation B: It is important that the longer-term financial viability of royalty
associations in areas affected is secured by a fallback statutory or constitutional
stipulation that a minimum investment ratio be maintained if associations are
performing irresponsibly.
Recommendation C: Immediate consideration should be given to amending legislation
to ensure that the beneficiaries of mining moneys are clearly specified.
7. An analysis of a number of mining agreements to 1984 indicates that the QML
Agreement incorporated the highest proportion of s.43 mining agreement payments to
s.64(3) 'areas affected' moneys. This ratio over the life of the mine was expected to be
$3 agreement money: $1 areas affected money. However, there are indications that
agreement moneys expected to realise the equivalent of a 2 per cent royalty ad valorem
only totalled between 1.25 to 1.5 per cent. Such payments of a de facto mineral rent (de
facto because Aboriginal traditional owners do not own the minerals) provide a greater
opportunity for Aboriginal interests to maximise income from regional resource
developments. However, such payments also highlight the legislative and perceived
ambiguities regarding the nature of royalty payments, and may create considerable
complexity in the structural mechanisms needed to disburse moneys. Such complexities
can seriously hamper effective Aboriginal participation in the financial management of
royalty associations.
Recommendation D: It is imperative that future mining agreements provide the bulk of
payments in a manner that requires accountability to recipients and ensures consistency
of distributive mechanisms and decision making.
8. There is merit in recent agreements, such as the Mt Todd Agreement, that specify
the creation of employment, training, education and enterprise opportunities and
concessions for Aboriginal people. However, it must be recognised that the QML
Agreement also included such provisions which were implemented, in part, by the
mining company, but were not closely monitored by the NLC, regional associations or
government.
Recommendation E: Mechanisms for achieving continued 'agreement accountability'
and compliance need to be established at the earliest phase of any resource development
project and should continue over the life of a development.
9. As a signatory of the QML Agreement (on behalf of traditional owners) and
owing to its statutory functions, the NLC has a crucial role in the West Arnhem region.
The requirement under s.35(2) of the Act that the NLC makes a determination in paying
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'areas affected' moneys and the requirement under s.35(A) that associations financially
report to it, provide the NLC with an unquestionable and very important statutory
monitoring role. Such a role is not without considerable difficulties and raises practical
and policy dilemmas in respect to the realisation of Aboriginal self-determination and
economic advancement. Nevertheless, it is of some concern that for a variety of reasons,
including wider political considerations, the NLC has been reluctant to directly
intervene in regulating the activities of both the Kunwinjku Association (1982-88) and
the NTOA. While a hands-off policy by the NLC can be readily justified in situations
where mining moneys are utilised in a financially responsible manner, it cannot be
justified where association management performance is clearly inadequate, when
resources are expended wastefully, and where committee members are labouring under
intense local pressures to disburse moneys against their better judgement.
10. In the early phases of the QML Agreement the NLC demonstrated procedural
shortcomings in both disbursing and monitoring the payment of mining moneys. These
primarily arose because of the NLC's initial unfamiliarity with the complex legal
nuances of ambiguous directions set out in the Aboriginal Land Rights Act,
compounded by a political environment which saw substantial government pressure on
the NLC to conclude the agreement. For example, in 1979 and 1980, the NLC
reinforced the emphasis on expenditure and cash distribution in the region by
distributing s.43 moneys in accord with s.35(2), rather than s.35(3) of the Aboriginal
Land Rights Act. More recently in 1990, agreement payments in relation to exploration
on Exploration Licence Application 2508 were incorrectly paid to the NTOA, and
earlier consultations over QML requests to conduct further exploration repeatedly
referred to a 'new' mine in the Nabarlek region. Such irregularities exacerbate regional
misunderstandings about the nature and role of mining moneys and about future
options.
Recommendation F: There is a need for the NLC to seek a clearer set of statutory
responsibilities in this complex area, and to establish policy guidelines to formalise a
more constructive and consistent monitoring role.
Recommendation G: Equally, government has a responsibility to establish
socioeconomic impact assessment as an ongoing feature of the development process,
not simply at the agreement negotiation stage. These assessments should include
mechanisms for monitoring ongoing agreement compliance and should be coordinated
by the relevant land council and Aboriginal associations.
Recommendation H: It is crucial that the NLC establish policy guidelines and
appropriate mechanisms to protect beneficiaries of mining from unreasonable external
political and economic pressures.
11. The NLC and the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA) perpetuated the
continuation of inappropriate structures when reconstituting the Kunwinjku Association
as the NTOA. Given the very poor financial performance of the former Association that
resulted in its winding up, well-documented by NLC staff and other researchers, an
inappropriate corporate structure was devised for the NTOA. In particular, there was
urgent need for close monitoring and active support of the new Association. What
eventuated was a reluctance by all institutions to actively intervene. The potential
opportunity cost of such inaction for the regional economy are significant: the QML
uranium mine at Nabarlek may have been a lost one-off opportunity to access critical
masses of discretionary capital by traditional owners of the Nabarlek mine site and
other Aboriginal people in the immediate vicinity of the mine.
Recommendation I: It is imperative that culturally-appropriate corporate structures
with suitable constitutions are established in consultation with proposed members to
ensure Aboriginal control and productive use of mining moneys paid for the one-off
extraction of non-renewable resources.
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Recommendation J: In particular, association structures should reflect a realistic
assessment of the financial and administrative skills of association members. Burdened
by cumbersome and complex structures, association members and committees may
become effectively disenfranchised from asserting direct control and decision-making
that is in their own best interests.
Recommendation K: Association objectives and the geographic area of potential
activity, need to be carefully specified and targeted to realistic and achievable ends.
Recommendation L: Training for Aboriginal association members in necessary
management and financial skills should be included in development agreements.
12. It is clear that royalty associations will inevitably encounter considerable
obstacles in the early period of their establishment. The NLC should not have to bear
the sole burden of monitoring and supplying financial advice to the NTOA and other
Aboriginal royalty associations. It should encourage and facilitate options for royalty
associations to seek financial and management advice from a diverse range of expertise,
particularly in the private sector and on a commercial basis.
Recommendation M: There is need for the loose federation of royalty associations that
used to regularly convene within the Northern Territory to be reactivated. Such a forum
could provide valuable advice on the basis of experience to new associations, assess
potential financial and management options, and coordinate mutually beneficial
activities.
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